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Quantitative competition analysis:  
Stationarity tests in geographic market definition 









The  paper  focuses  on  the  delineation  of  geographic  markets  in  competition  analysis, 
investigating the use of both quantitative and qualitative evaluation in the market definition 
exercise.  To this end, the first part is devoted to a conceptual framework for market definition 
(adopted from Haldrup (2003)).  Thereafter, a variety of price tests are explored that can be 
applied  within  the  quantitative  part  of  the  framework.    Similar  to  Forni  (2004),  the  paper 
emphasizes  the  use  of  stationarity  tests  (that  is,  tests  for  the  existence  of  unit  roots)  – 
illustrating their application to a recent competition investigation in South Africa. 
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Quantitative competition analysis:  




In the recent investigation of the proposed merger between Sasol and Engen, the relevant geographic market was 
crucial to the market power arguments of the different parties involved.  In fact, the geographic market definition 
accepted by the South African competition authorities led to their rejecting the merger.  Geographic market 
definition has also been contentious in abuse of dominance investigations, such as the case of Patensie Sitrus 
Beherend (a former citrus co-operative in the Sondags River Valley) (Competition Commission, 2002).   
 
This paper focuses on the delineation of geographic markets in competition analysis, investigating the use of both 
quantitative techniques (as proposed by Forni (2004)) and qualitative evaluation in the market definition exercise.  
Although  the  product  market  definition  is  also  included  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  discussion,  the  empirical 
application focuses on geographic markets1.  
 
A systematic geographic market definition exercise requires a clear rationale and a conceptual framework.  This 
framework  is  developed  in  the  next  section;  a  following  section  elaborates  on  the  quantitative  procedures 
(specifically, tests of price co-movement).  Lastly, an empirical demonstration is attempted, based on a recent 
investigation into alleged abuse of dominance in the South African milk industry at the producer/processor level.    
 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION 
 
Competition analysis is geared towards the assessment of market power, regardless of whether the concern is one 
of horizontal integration, vertical integration or alleged abuse of dominance.  However, the measurement of 
market power usually requires a clear delineation of a relevant market in both product and geographic terms.  
While the literature has proposed methods for the direct measurement of market power (that is, without defining 
a relevant market), competition authorities in South Africa and Europe continue to rely on market definition to 
assess the extent of market power2.  Consequently, the market definition exercise remains important in achieving 
the ultimate goal of measuring market power3.   
 
The focus on market power in competition economics implies that a market for competition policy purposes 
differs from a general economic market.  In competition economics a market constitutes that set of products and 
that geographic area that can potentially be monopolized by the firm under investigation (Geroski (1998: 681); 
Massey (2000: 324)).  This market, in turn, is used to investigate market power, i.e. the firm’s actual capacity to 
monopolize.  This involves identifying (i) all firms selling potential substitutes for the products of the firm under 
investigation  and  (ii)  all  firms  offering  these  potential  substitute  products  in  other  geographic  areas  and 
reasonably capable of potentially providing the product in regions where the firm under investigation is operating.  
The focus, as Motta (2005: 102) notes, is on identifying those firms whose operations constrain anti-competitive 
behaviour by the firm under investigation.  Products and geographic areas that meet these criteria are included in 
the product and geographic market respectively.   
 
This notion of the antitrust4 market is accepted by competition authorities in the United States, Europe5 and 
South Africa and is embodied in the so-called SSNIP (small but significant non-transitory increase in price) test 
used to delineate product and geographic markets in these jurisdictions.  The SSNIP test (also known as the 
hypothetical monopolist test) for market definition is described in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the US 
                                                       
1 However, recent work by Haldrup and Møllgaard (2005) questions the “sequential” approach to market definition and 
argues in favour of the simultaneous definition of the product and the geographic market.   
2 This is partly due to lack of sufficient data in most competition cases and partly due to the need to verify results obtained 
from direct methods against the results of the more traditional methods relying on the definition of a relevant market (Motta, 
2005: 101).  
3 Theron (2001) discusses the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm used as a guiding framework by South African 
competition authorities and notes that “[t]he purpose of market delineation is to permit calculation of market shares, which 
are then used to evaluate market power issues…” (Theron, 2001: 622).  
4 “Antitrust” is the American term for competition-related issues.  
5 However, Copenhagen Economics (a Danish economics consultancy) suggests that the European Commission (EC) has 
not consistently adhered to the SSNIP framework in the context of geographic market definition – a situation that the EC 
has apparently sought to remedy (Copenhagen Economics, 2003).    
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Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (1992: 3): 
 
“A market is defined as a product or group of products and a geographic area in which it is produced or sold such that a 
hypothetical profit-maximising firm, not subject to price regulation, that was the only present and future producer or seller of 
those products in that area likely would impose at least a ‘small but significant non-transitory’ increase in price, assuming the 
terms of sale of all other products are held constant.  A relevant market is a group of products and a geographic area that is 
no bigger than necessary to satisfy this test”. 
 
The SSNIP test represents a thought experiment in which the competition analyst defines the relevant geographic 
market by considering whether the firm under investigation is capable of maintaining a small price increase of 
5%-10%  for  a  twelve-month  period  (for  example)  without  a  reduction  in  profits.    It  starts  with  only  the 
geographic area in which the firm under investigation is operating.  If the firm’s profits are ultimately adversely 
affected by the price increase, the geographic market is too narrow.  Consequently, a broader geographic market 
can be defined by including that region from which competition is most likely following the price increase.  The 
thought experiment is repeated and other regions are added until a broad enough geographic market has been 
defined in which the firm under investigation could raise prices on a profitable and sustainable basis.  A similar 
exercise can be carried out for the delineation of the product market.   
 
(a)   Operational versions of the SSNIP test 
 
Given  its  nature  as  a  philosophical  exercise,  the  SSNIP  test  must  be  rendered  operational  for  empirical 
application.    The  fundamental  problem  in  converting  the  SSNIP  test  to  an  operational  version  lies  with 
interpreting  this  thought  experiment  incorrectly  as  a  technical  statement  specifying  threshold  elasticities  for 
market delineation.  Bishop and Walker (1998: 70) argue that the “precise language in which the test is described” 
may lead competition analysts to infer, incorrectly, that markets should be defined by the size of cross price 
elasticities alone6.  Instead, they argue that the SSNIP test is intended to broadly convey the central importance of 
competitive  constraints  (from  the  demand  and  supply  side)  in  defining  competition  markets.    Therefore, 
competition analysts should consider a diverse set of evidence when delineating geographic (or product) markets.   
 
In a study on geographic market definition for the European Commission, Copenhagen Economics (2003: 66) 
has suggested the following framework that integrates different pieces of evidence into a consistent “story”: 
(i)  Initially, descriptive and anecdotal evidence can be used to identify barriers to either demand-side or supply-
side  substitution.    Such  evidence  may  include  transport  costs,  product  flows7  and  other  qualitative 
information  (Copenhagen  Economics  (2003:  66);  McCarthy  and  Thomas  (2003:  8-9)).    Based  on  the 
evidence, the competition analyst then defines a hypothetical geographic market.         
(ii)  Where data availability permits, the accuracy of the initial conclusions should be verified empirically.  This 
may  include  the  estimation of a demand  system  (to calculate  elasticities)  or an evaluation  of  price  co-
movement (see Massey (2000); Haldrup (2003); Forni (2004)).  The latter is of particular importance where 
data is limited to prices.  In such cases, Hosken and Taylor (2004) note that price tests may be useful for 
market delineation – provided that the tests are part of a larger body of evidence (such as the evidence 
presented in (i)).   
 
This  paper  generally  focuses  on  quantitative  procedures  in  market  definition  (that  is,  part  (ii)  of  the  above 
framework)  and  specifically  on  the  use  of  tests  of  price  co-movement  (given  that  data  constraints  usually 
necessitate their  use).   Therefore, prior to attempting an  empirical  application  of  the  above framework,  the 
following section considers various forms of price tests. 
 
3. TESTS OF PRICE COMOVEMENT 
 
In hypothesis testing, the choice of a specific test is guided by the question at hand.  In this case, the question is 
whether the geographic market defined in the first part of the preceding framework is appropriate.  As noted, 
data constraints in many situations force the competition analyst to rely primarily on price data.  But can price 
                                                       
6 This does not at all preclude the estimation and use of elasticities, but instead casts the net wider to test the consistency of 
the evidence from the elasticities against other pieces of economic evidence.   
7 In South Africa, the Competition Commission (2002) has applied the so-called Elzinga-Hogarty test to identify geographic 
markets in several competition cases.  The test is based on the proportion of consumption imported to a region and the 
proportion of production exported from that region.  If any of these proportions exceed arbitrary thresholds, the geographic 
market definition is considered too narrow – as suppliers from outside the region offer effective competitive constraints on 
the behaviour of suppliers in the region.      
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data (or statistical features thereof) be used to verify a geographic market definition?   
 
Stigler and Sherwin (1985) proposed tests of price co-movement for market definition, based on the argument 
that prices within a single market should converge, allowing for some variability due to transport costs (Stigler 
and Sherwin, 1985).  Haldrup (2003) argues further that the requirement is not that prices in two regions should 
be equal if the two regions are to constitute a single market.  Therefore, the requirement is not one of absolute 
price convergence.  Instead, relative convergence is required – where price adjustments in one area affect price 
adjustments in the other area.   
 
Critics of the price co-movement approach point out that market definition using tests of price convergence is 
not consistent with the concept of an antitrust market.  Massey (2000: 317-318) points out that while price tests 
establish whether price series in different locations are “linked”, these tests do not verify whether firms have the 
capacity  to  raise  prices.    Consequently,  Massey  (2000)  argues  that  price  elasticities  are  the  only  appropriate 
measures for the purpose of market definition.       
 
Two  comments  are  appropriate  here.    Firstly,  while  the  elasticity  approach  may  offer  superior  guidance  in 
defining the geographic market (and may be preferred by US competition authorities (see Hosken and Taylor 
(2004: 465)), it is not without its own problems.  In particular, Forni (2004) offers a detailed analysis of the so-
called “cellophane fallacy” encountered when using price elasticities in non-merger competition investigations.  
Typically, the price elasticity of demand is less than unity for lower prices and greater than unity for higher prices.  
But at which price should the elasticity be evaluated?  Usually current market prices are used.  However, in a 
market  where  firms  possess  pricing  power,  the  prevailing  price  will  be  above  the  competitive  price.  
Consequently,  the  correspondingly  higher  elasticity  (as  compared  to  the  competitive  situation)  will  indicate 
incorrectly that the firm does not have market power.  Analysts foreseeing the problem may opt to use a lower 
price, but such an action leads to circular reasoning.  When the purpose of the analysis is to evaluate possible 
abuse of market power by a firm, the very goal of defining the market is to ultimately assess such market power.  
Hence, any assumption that the prevailing price is too high indicates that the analyst holds a prior view of market 
power, before it has been confirmed.  The name “cellophane fallacy” is derived from the famous US case in 
which Du Pont, a manufacturer of cellophane, argued, on the basis of a high price elasticity for cellophane, that 
the material competed with aluminium foil and other packaging in a single market (see Forni (2004: 445-446) and 
Bishop and Walker (1998: 49)).  In addition, and certainly of practical importance, data constraints may prevent 
the reliable estimation of elasticities.   
 
Secondly,  Hosken  and  Taylor  (2004),  Genesove  (2004)  and  Massey  (2000)  argue  that  geographic  market 
definition based on price co-movement, under very general conditions, could be misleading and that it “requires 
the economist to have substantial institutional knowledge of the markets studied” (Hosken and Taylor, 2004: 
466).  Along similar lines, McCarthy and Thomas (2003: 15) point to cases where two regions exhibit significant 
price co-movement, but supply constraints prevent producers in one region from competing with producers in 
the other region.  Alternatively, they also argue that areas for which price co-movement is not substantial may 
very well  constitute a single market,  if one of the  regions holds  excess  production  capacity.   However,  the 
framework presented earlier addresses these concerns by incorporating several pieces of evidence to ensure a 
consistent set of arguments.  More generally, all statistical tests involve the risk of incorrect inferences, but the 
framework presented here tries to minimize the risk by requiring the results of particular statistical tests to be 
supported by other qualitative evidence or even, where feasible, alternative statistical tests.   
 
Several time series techniques are available to investigate how the behaviour of a price series in one location 
affects the behaviour of a price series in another area.  Table 1 presents a taxonomy of these techniques: 
 
Table 1: Taxonomy of price tests 
 
Both price series required to have 
same order of integration 
Final series I(0) 
(stationary) 
Final series 
I(1), I(2), etc. 
Price series can have different orders of 
integration  
 




Co-integration analysis  
 
 
Stationarity test of  
the price ratio 
 
Correlation analysis is frequently used to compare the behaviour of price series in different geographic locations.  
However,  where  the original  price  series  are  both  unit  root  processes,  transforming  the  series  to  stationary  
  6 
versions entails a significant loss of information.  In addition to the statistical critique, the literature contains 
several economic objections – of which two is worth noting here.  Firstly, even if the original price series are both 
stationary, correlation analysis offers no objective benchmark against which the competition analyst may judge 
whether the price co-movement is significant in an economic sense (Bishop and Walker (1998: 238), Forni (2004: 
450)).  Secondly, contemporaneous correlation coefficients ignore the possible existence of lagged relationships 
between two price series (Forni, 2004: 450).  Given the statistical and economic criticisms of price correlation 
tests,  co-integration  studies  have  received  attention  in  the  market  definition  literature.    While  tests  of  co-
integration  address the problems  cited above,  their  merit  lies  in how closely these dynamic tests match  the 
fundamental  motivation  for  using  price  tests  in  general,  namely  to  investigate  price  convergence  in  different 
geographic areas.           
 
In  these  analyses,  evidence  of  co-integration  is  usually  considered  sufficient  proof  of  price  convergence.  
However, Forni (2004) proposes that it is more prudent to test whether the co-integrating vector of two price 
series is the vector (1; -1), as this would indicate whether the two regions form a perfectly integrated market.  
Haldrup (2003), however, notes that a (1; -1) co-integrating vector is not a necessity in defining competition 
markets, although he points out that such a relationship does have an intuitive interpretation in terms of the price 
differential.  Therefore, testing such a restriction may be useful – especially given that such a restriction test 
allows the competition economist to circumvent an actual co-integration analysis.  Forni (2004) shows that testing 
for a co-integrating vector of (1; -1) is equivalent to testing whether the log of the ratio of the two price series is 
stationary (an easier approach which also saves time).  Hence, the competition analyst can establish whether the 
co-integrating vector is (1; -1) by calculating the log of the ratio of the two price series and then applying a 
conventional  unit  root  test  to  evaluate  stationarity.    Apart  from  its  simplicity,  Forni  (2004)  also  notes  that 
stationarity tests on the log price ratio are invariant with respect to the use of nominal or real price data.   
 
In their discussion of Forni’s proposal of a stationarity test for market definition, Hosken and Taylor (2004) point 
out that stationarity tests may be misleading when applied to product markets trading in differentiated goods.  
This is not necessarily applicable to geographic markets, although it is conceivable that a large price movement 
for a particular good in one small geographic area may not have a material effect on the price of the same good in 
a very large adjacent area.  However, Hosken and Taylor (2004: 469) also highlight the more serious problem of 
the stationarity outcome being misleading in two situations: 
(i)  Where a single shock is common to both series8.  Forni (2004) also suggests that, prior to inferring market 
singleness from an outcome of stationarity, the series’ exposure to common input costs and shocks should 
be  analysed.    Although  not  settling  the  issue,  the  framework  introduced  earlier  arguably  reduces  the 
possibility of incorrect inferences, given that results from price tests should be consistent with other pieces 
of qualitative and quantitative evidence.   
(ii)  Where the original price series are themselves both stationary.   
 
In  sum, tests of price co-movement have  been criticized  in the  literature, but  continue  to  be employed  by 
competition analysts due to their simplicity and the data constraints that prohibit more advanced analysis, such as 
estimation of elasticities.  The arguments of the preceding paragraphs are summarized in Table 2, which shows 
the outcomes of price stationarity tests and their proposed interpretation.   
 
Table 2: Interpretation of stationarity test on the log ratio of prices in two geographic regions  










Single geographic market only if: 
(i)  price series of at least one area is non-stationary 
(ii)  price series not subject to common shocks according to other evidence 
 
 
The  following  section  present  an  empirical  application  of  the  framework  for  geographic  market  definition, 
including price stationarity tests, in a recent South African competition investigation. 
  
4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
                                                       
8 The problem of common shocks also applies to the correlation statistic.  McDermott and Scott (2000) discuss similar 
problems with the correlation measure traditionally used in business cycle studies.   






































A proper assessment of the market power held by a particular firm is premised on a correct market definition.  In 
line with US and European measures, the South African Competition Act states that a firm under investigation is 
assumed  dominant  if  it  holds  in  excess  of  45%  of  the  relevant  market  –  and that  there  is  no defence  for 
dominance.    Whether  such  a  stringent  approach  is  the  correct  one  is  debatable,  though  it  is  clear  that  the 
delineation of the market is a crucial step (see Theron, 2001: 620-622).   
 
The following paragraphs discuss the application of the market definition framework to an investigation into 
alleged anti-competitive conduct by a South African dairy processor.  The product market was not contentious 
and  was  defined  as  the  upstream  market  for  fresh  milk  between  dairy  processors  and  dairy  farmers.    The 
following  paragraphs  discuss  evidence9  considered  in  the  delineation  of  the  geographic  market,  using  the 
framework presented earlier.         
 
(a)   Descriptive evidence on geographic substitutability 
 
The dairy processor owns several processing plants in the southern regions of South Africa.  The question, for 
the purposes of geographic market definition, is whether trade is possible (or, perhaps, even normal) between 
dairy farmers and dairy processors located in adjacent regions.  As noted earlier, it is important that a correct 
assessment is made, as too narrow a market will overstate the market power of the dairy processor in some of the 
southern regions10.     
 
The lack of representative data is arguably the greatest challenge in conducting empirical competition analysis.  In 
this case, no aggregate data on milk flows between different geographic regions are available.  However, transfer 
volumes of fresh milk between four different plants of the dairy processor are available.  The size of these milk 
transfer figures may indicate whether transport costs can be considered a potential barrier to substitutability – 
offering initial indications of whether the relevant geographic market is defined broadly enough.   
 
Figure 1 shows that, on average, the volumes of milk imported to four different processing plants in the south are 
negligible for the period 2004-2005.  For example, imports to Plant A, the plant which has the highest proportion 
of milk imports relative to total production, lies at only 0.3% of total plant production.  However, average 
volumes could be misleading.  The average figure for Plant B is calculated by excluding the months of June and 
July 2004 during which large milk transfers were made from Plant A to Plant B – accounting for 24% and 13% 
respectively of total production at Plant B for these months.  Therefore, while it is safe to conclude that large-
scale transfers are not common, occasionally large flows indicate that transport costs may not be prohibitively 
large so as to prevent milk transfers from taking place between the different southern regions.      
 
















More importantly, the transfer story is quite different for the single northern plant, which the dairy processor 
owns in addition to its plants in the south.  The dairy producer discontinued buying milk in the northern region 
in June 2003, due to what it considered excessive prices demanded by milk farmers.  Subsequently, milk used at 
the northern plant has been imported from the different southern regions.  Figure 2 illustrates the composition of 
                                                       
9 The confidential nature of the investigation prevents full disclosure of the issues.   
10 There is a bias here, as this firm has an incentive to argue in favour of a broad geographic market.   









































Plant A Plant C Plant D
the southern milk transfers to the northern plant for 2004 and 2005.  Plant A and Plant C (who are furthest from 
the northern plant) have been the main sources for the milk used at the northern plant, indicating that long-
distance transport costs are not prohibitively high.     
 
In sum, the consistent milk transfers from the southern regions to the northern plant as well as the possibility of 
occasional large transfers between the southern regions appear to support the notion of a geographic market that 
is larger than regional.  To test the preliminary hypothesis of a larger geographic market, the price behaviour in 
different southern regions should be investigated.    
  

















(b)   Issues in evaluating milk price ratios 
 
A practical difficulty encountered in a study of milk price behaviour is a lack of representative milk prices, as 
different processors pay different prices to milk farmers – with such price data for the different competing 
processors not being freely available.  However, SAMILCO, an industry body representing a large portion of 
dairy farmers in the southern regions, calculates an average monthly milk price for its three constituent regions: 
Western Cape11, Southern Cape and Eastern Cape.  As noted earlier, unit root tests may be carried out on the log 
of  the  ratio  of  milk  prices  in  any  two  of  these  regions  to  establish whether the  particular  ratio  contains a 
persistent trend.  Mathematically, the log price ratio (
ij
t r ) between region i and region j can be described as: 
 
jt it jt it
jt
it ij
t p p P P
P
P
r − = − = = log log log                            (1) 
where 
it P   seasonally adjusted12 milk price in region i at time t 
jt P   seasonally adjusted milk price in region j at time t  
i ; j = {Western Cape, Southern Cape, Eastern Cape}, where i ≠ j 
   
In this case, the log ratios (
ij
t r ) can be calculated for the following pairs of regions: 
(i)  Western Cape and Southern Cape (hereafter called the W:S ratio). 
(ii)  Western Cape and Eastern Cape (W:E ratio). 
(iii)  Southern Cape and Eastern Cape (S:E ratio). 
 
Persistence in any of these ratios will indicate that the particular ratio does not revert to a long-run equilibrium 
value.  However, as Hosken and Taylor (2004) emphasize, the competition analyst should not lose sight of 
                                                       
11 The Western Cape region does not refer to the Western Cape Province.  
12 Haldrup (2003: 16) notes that seasonal adjustment is particularly important for time series analysis in competition cases – 
where shorter, higher frequency time series are typically used.  The US Census Bureau’s seasonal adjustment procedure X12 is 
used.  Fok et al (2006) illustrate that alternative procedures, such as the TRAMO/SEATS procedure, perform equally well.  
The results for this data set based on the alternative procedures support their argument.            











































































































































































































































































institutional details that may alter the conclusion drawn based on these simple tests.  This is important in the case 
of the W:S ratio, presented by Figure 3.   
 
Figure 3: Log of milk price ratio between Western Cape and Southern Cape 
 












At the start of 2004, dairy farmers in the Southern Cape argued that the price differential between the Western 
and Southern Cape exceeded the transport cost by a significant margin.  The farmers subsequently threatened to 
transport milk from the Southern to the Western Cape region.  In response, the processors started adjusting the 
Southern Cape milk price incrementally each month to address the farmers’ concerns.  These adjustments were 
followed by a formal agreement between a prominent processor and its Southern Cape SAMILCO members in 
December 2005, stipulating “the adjusted Western Cape regional … average milk price shall not exceed the 
adjusted regional … average milk price for the Southern Cape region plus the cost of transport of milk from the 
Southern Cape region to the Western Cape region.”  Arguably, such institutional changes will have altered the 
dynamics of competition between the Western and Southern Cape regions – creating a single geographic market.  
This implies that, in this case, the past behaviour of the W:S ratio may be misleading.  Consequently, this ratio will 
not be evaluated further.   
 
As the price adjustments have occurred throughout 2005, it is prudent to exclude 2005 when evaluating the 
stationarity of the W:E and S:E price ratios.  This is clarified when plots of these ratios are considered, as 
presented in Figure 4 and 5.  The W:E ratio declines substantially from mid-2004 onwards, while the S:E ratio 
grows substantially during 2005.  Although this is not necessarily due to the agreement, the identification problem 
requires a conservative approach.   
 
Figure 4: Log of milk price ratio between Western Cape and Eastern Cape 
   
























While these ratios do not appear to be trend-stationary over time, it is difficult to deduce visually whether the 
ratios are difference-stationary (i.e. whether the ratios contain stochastic trends).  Hence, a formal hypothesis test 
is needed.   
 
(c)   Stationarity tests on milk price ratios 
 
Choosing a unit root test involves identifying a test with a low probability of error – i.e. a low probability of 
committing either a Type I or Type II error when testing the null hypothesis (that the price ratio contains a 
stochastic trend) against an alternative hypothesis.  This amounts to identifying a hypothesis test enjoying good 
power properties (i.e. a test with a high probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when false).  In addition, for a 
given sample, the actual size (Type I error) should not differ substantially from the nominal size initially selected 
(say 5% or 10%).  As Hosken and Taylor (2004) point out in their critique of Forni (2004), conventional unit root 
tests such as the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) tests 
suffer from severe size distortions.  This observation is representative of a general conclusion in the econometric 
literature that traditional tests for detecting stochastic trends face severe small sample problems.  In fact, in their 
renowned  book  on  the  problems encountered in  unit  root testing, Maddala and  Kim  (1998: 92) argue that 
“[a]lthough often used, the DF [and] ADF … tests lack power against meaningful alternatives and should not be 
used any more”.     
 
The past decade has seen a plethora of attempts to address the size distortion in traditional unit root tests, 
including  the  introduction  of  modified  information  criteria  to  ensure  optimal  lag  length  selection.    A  very 
important strand of the literature also aims to estimate the “nuisance” parameters causing the size distortions.  A 
set of tests that have been shown to have superior size and power properties are the modified versions of the 
Phillips-Perron  (PP),  Bhargava (B) and  Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock  (ERS) unit root  tests  proposed by  Ng  and 
Perron (2001).  This paper does not discuss the technical detail of the Ng and Perron (2001) tests, but a fairly 
complete review  is  provided  in  Haldrup  and Jansson (2006).   Some applied econometric packages (such as 
Eviews 5) already provide functionality to run these tests.      
 
This paper applies the different Ng and Perron (2001) tests – comparing the results to ensure a more robust 
conclusion.  This is akin to the approach adopted by Forni (2004), but Maddala and Kim (1998: 126-128) argue 
that such “confirmatory data analysis” may be less helpful than it appears.  In particular, they present evidence 
that the proportion of correct inferences is low for the conventional unit root tests where the true DGP is 
stationary.    Table  3  presents  the  inferences  from  unit  root  tests  where  lag  lengths  are  based  on  modified 
information criteria (as proposed by Ng and Perron (2001) and Perron and Ng (1996)):   
 
Table 3: Outcomes of unit root tests (non-rejection reported at 10% significance level) for 2002-2004  
 
Price ratio 
MZa  MZt  MSB  MPT 
























Do not reject 






















Do not reject 
Reject*** 
Reject*** 
*** Significant at 1% level  ** Significant at 5% level  * Significant at 10% level  
 
The results in Table 3 support the conclusion that the W:E log price ratio is stationary, given consistent rejection 
of the null hypothesis that the series contains a unit root.  Although the test is not rejected from lag length of six 
onwards, these non-rejections are the result of a natural loss of power due to the sub-optimal lag choices (and not 
due to the specific structure of the test).  Similarly, the S:E log price ratio also appears to be stationary.  The 
peculiar non-rejection at a lag length of two is a sobering reminder that although these tests have improved power 
properties they are certainly not perfect.  In particular, the size of the sample (thirty-six data points) probably 
contributes to the problem.   
 
(d)   Summary  
 
The price tests provide substantial support for a larger market in the south.  However, as argued earlier, common  
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shocks (and not competition dynamics) may be the source of the co-movement.  Within the framework presented 
earlier, these price test results combined with other qualitative evidence on the SAMILCO agreement and on 
product flows support the identification of at most two markets in the south – one in the Western Cape / 
Southern Cape and one in the Eastern Cape.  Nonetheless, either of these conclusions results in a market share 
for the company under investigation of below 45% – weakening the allegations of dominance and market power 




This paper has argued that incorporating several forms of qualitative and quantitative evidence serves to reduce 
errors in the market definition exercise.  In particular, the application of stationarity tests on price data shows that 
quantitative evaluation can be a powerful tool in competition analysis.  While data challenges may prevent more 
involved quantitative approaches, simple  price  tests  can help  to  justify the proposed market in  competition 
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